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Toward Standards for Materiality(?) 
William Holmes 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
The term "materiality" in accounting and auditing literature is variously 
used in relation to misrepresentation, disclosure, segregation of extraordinary 
items, and audit requirements. The original use in accounting was in relation 
to misrepresentation and disclosure. If we can concentrate on these aspects of 
materiality, I believe the findings will apply equally well to the remaining aspects. 
This is the approach that has been adopted throughout this paper. 
Some History of Materiality 
In an artictle I recently wrote for the February, 1972 Journal of Accountancy, 
entitled "Materiality Through the Looking Glass," I traced the history of the 
use of the term materiality in American accounting and quoted examples to show 
that the concept was already well established in the early 1900's. I pointed out 
that the English Chartered Accountants who arrived in the 1880's and 1890's 
had brought the concept with them, and I showed that the concept was inherent 
in the provisions of the early British Companies Acts. I quoted the definition of 
Lord Davey's committee relative to an 1895 updating of these acts that— 
Every contract or fact is material which would influence the judgment 
of a prudent investor in determining whether he would subscribe for the 
shares or debentures offered by the prospectus.1 
The article pointed out that this type of definition was merely the old com-
mon law doctrine governing cases of misrepresentation and deceit applied to the 
sale of securities, and Oliver Wendell Holmes was quoted to show that the 
American Common Law paralleled the English Common Law in this respect. 
The article also reviewed the accounting literature in America on the 
subject of materiality, pointing out that the earliest articles on the subject date 
from the 1930's. I surmised that prior to the 1930s accountants generally re-
garded the term in its legal context; as something for the courts to interpret and 
not something over which accountants could claim jurisdiction. 
The term materiality was increasingly used in "official" accounting literature 
beginning with the 1930's. An "official" definition from the Securities Acts was 
incorporated in the S-X Regulations published in 1940, and the term was also 
used extensively in the early Bulletins of the American Institute. Despite this, 
writers in the 1930's and 1940's still seem to have regarded the concept as a 
child of law and only a foster child of accounting and asked for, at most, "a part in 
any final determination of its meaning." 
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The Search for Standards 
Since the early 1950's a different mood predominates—a search for standards, 
and a growing conviction that the accounting profession should be the one to 
establish such standards. This "positivist" attitude has been best represented in 
the writings of Sam Woolsey and Leopold Bernstein, who believed "standards," 
"official guidelines," and "border zones" should be established, and established 
by accountants. In my earlier article I discussed this matter briefly in the light 
of recent court decisions and articles by non-accountants and suggested that it 
would be extremely difficult to establish meaningful standards which would 
embrace "all the circumstances"—to quote the judge in the BarChris case. Robert 
H . Montgomery recognized the problem succinctly in his 1940 sixth edition, 
which took account of the impact of the Securities Acts, when he said— 
The auditor who examines a balance sheet to be included in a registra-
tion statement must decide for himself what the mental processes of the 
"average prudent investor" might be!2 (The final punctuation is ex-
pressive.) 
As I see it, the chief difficulty in establishing standards for materiality lies 
with the common law doctrines of "influence" or "reliance." To quote Oliver 
Wendell Holmes again— 
It is said that a fraudulent representation must be material to have that 
effect. But how are we to decide whether it is material or not? It must 
be by an appeal to ordinary experience to decide whether a belief that 
the fact was as represented would naturally have led to, or a contrary 
belief would naturally have prevented, the making of the contract.3 
(Emphasis added) 
The more modern Restatement of Torts says much the same thing. 
A fact is material if its existence or non-existence is a matter to which 
a reasonable man would attach importance in determining his course 
of action in the transaction. (Emphasis added) 
So we see that in the common law it is not so much the nature or extent of the 
"fact" as the influence it had on the mind of a reasonable man in the particular 
transaction, and, to quote the judge in BarChris, ". . . in the light of all the 
circumstances." 
Professor Louis Loss comments that many of the Blue Sky Laws carry for-
ward the common law concept. With respect to the New York law, he says— 
The offense is committed by material misrepresentation intended to 
influence the bargain, although they may be due to negligence rather 
than dishonesty.4 (Emphasis added) 
The Securities Acts, where they apply, introduced a different doctrine in 
that reliance on the misrepresentation is not always necessary—for instance under 
Section 12(2). This may explain the different emphasis of the SEC definition 
which— 
. . . limits the information required to those matters as to which an 
average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before pur-
chasing the securities.5 (Emphasis added) 
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I do not know whether the words "before purchasing the securities" carry 
with them the thought of influence and reliability. However, if it is argued 
that materiality has a different meaning under the Securities Acts than under 
common law or under respective Blue Sky laws, the problem of setting standards 
becomes doubly difficult. Presumably then materiality would mean one thing 
for a large private placement of bonds and another for a public sale of common 
stock under the SEC. 
To quote Louis Loss again— 
Inevitably, to be sure, some element of reliance is inherent in the concept 
of materiality.6 
So we see that the concepts of "reliance" and "influence" coupled with the 
requirement to look at "all the circumstances" lie at the heart of difficulties in 
any attempt to establish accounting standards for materiality. The weight of the 
accounting data as against the weight of other factors will vary case by case and 
an accounting misrepresentation that would be material in one situation may 
well not be material in another. The factors are entirely relative rather than 
absolute. One wonders whether this dichotomy between relative and absolute 
values could be at the heart of the disagreement between the Company and its 
auditors on the one hand and the SEC on the other hand in the Occidental 
Petroleum matter where, based on the figures given in the Wall Street Journal 
report, the distortion of net income amounted to $8.9 million out of a total of 
$174.8 million. We noted above the different emphasis of the SEC definition 
of materiality. 
My own opinion is that if we accept the term materiality with all its 
attendant legal nuances—and I see no alternative to doing so—it becomes im-
practical to establish purely accounting standards for the term. I would suggest, 
however, a practical alternative. 
A Practical Alternative: Significant Distortion 
The auditor's "certificate" states that the financial statements are fairly 
presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. We have 
no professional definition for the word "fairness," but it would seem to me to 
be more of an intrinsic attribute of the financial statements themselves and less 
dependent on the many factors involved in the term materiality. If we accept 
this for the moment, we might establish standards to measure the point at 
which financial statements per se might cease to be "fair"—a standard of "sig-
nificant distortion" if I may coin a phrase. For instance, we might decide that 
any distortion in the balance sheet in excess of say five per cent of total assets 
would be "significant distortion" of the balance sheet, irrespective of the effect 
in a particular instance on the average prudent investor. The income statement, 
of course, poses more problems since the standard would have to embrace com-
panies with regular income, companies with cyclical income, and companies with 
a pattern of negligible income. It might be better to relate such a standard to a 
theoretical income necessary to provide "normal" return on investment. To 
cancel the effect of variations in debt/equity ratio as between companies it might 
be advisable to measure the return on a base of total assets less current liabilities. 
However, my purpose here is not to offer solutions as to how the standard would 
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be defined but merely to set the stage. If we adopted such standards we could 
then require disclosure action or qualification of the auditor's opinion for distor-
tion in excess of such standard—even if materiality indicated a higher level. For 
instance, turning again to BarChris, the 15.7 per cent difference in net income 
might be "significant distortion" even although the judge ruled it was not material. 
When materiality considerations suggested a factor lower than the "sig-
nificant distortion" factor, the lower measure would take effect—a rule of 
"lower of materiality or standard significant distortion factor." For example, 
suppose we establish a 10 per cent factor for the income statement, and in a 
particular case the company is on the verge of breaking through a "times interest" 
coverage factor affecting its bondholders where a 5 per cent change in income 
would spell the difference between interest covered and interest not covered. In 
this case the 10 per cent standard distortion factor might have to give way to 
the 5 per cent materiality factor. 
It is fairly obvious that in those cases where the accounting misrepresentation 
is the only factor involved which would influence the investor—i.e., ignoring 
completely such things as nature of industry, size of company, history of stock 
prices, changes in management, announcement of technology breakthrough, 
acquisition of significant patents, discovery of new resources, environmental prob-
lems, the state of the national economy, and the international financial scene, 
etc. etc.—then, ignoring all of these except the accounting data, 
Materiality = Significant Distortion 
This is the problem in evaluating the possibility of establishing materiality 
standards from research studies based on case examples, such as those used by 
Professor Woolsey in 1954. The responses were answers primarily to levels of sig-
nificant distortion rather than to real life problems in materiality. 
It is for this reason, also, that I do not like the latest (1968) English Institute 
pronouncement that, "In an accounting sense a matter is material if its nondis-
closure, misstatement or omission would be likely to distort the view given by 
the accounts or other statement under consideration."7 I don't believe the term 
materiality can be limited to "in an accounting sense." It may be said that any 
decision by an accountant as to materiality in a particular case is always correct 
short of a court of law. If the decision isn't challenged, then at least pragmatically, 
the decision was a good one. The court will not limit its judgment to matters 
"in an accounting sense." I believe the English Institute was seeking to isolate 
the accounting misrepresentation in the manner I have suggested above and might 
have solved the problem by recognizing this as "significant distortion" rather 
than materiality. The English common law and the various Companies Acts 
have always followed the "reliance" concept with its attendant "in the light of 
all the circumstances," and I do not believe the Institute's latest definition is 
meaningful since it obviously seeks to establish a concept of materiality based 
purely on the accounting data. 
Distinguishing Materiality and Significant Distortion 
It may be suggested that the above arguments amount to no more than 
splitting hairs on a matter of semantics. This may be so, but they are hairs of 
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some importance and this distinction between materiality and significance is 
somewhat overdue. In 1959 Carman Blough was saying— 
Possibly these (reasonably informative disclosures; materiality; and 
significance) are terms which defy definition . . . 8 
and the need for the distinction is noticeable in paragraph .11 of the General 
section of the Current Text of APB Accounting Principles, which states— 
The committee contemplates that its opinions will have application 
only to items material and significant in the relative circumstances.9 
(Emphasis added) 
As things stand today I am not sure what distinction between the terms the 
committee had in mind. 
An interesting situation related to this matter of semantics is evident in 
looking at the evolution of the present AICPA ethics rule governing misrepre-
sentation. The earliest rule in 1917 used the word "essential," and in 1923 this 
was changed to "essential and material" with respect to misrepresentation for 
which disciplinary action could be taken. However, in both cases the rule was left 
in the broad concept of looking beyond the financial statements in measuring ma-
teriality. The 1941 version of Rule 5, which has been readopted as Article 2.02 
of the 1965 amendment, reads as follows: 
In expressing an opinion on representations in financial statements which 
he has examined, a member or an associate shall be held guilty of an act 
discreditable to the profession if— 
(a) He fails to disclose a material fact known to him which is not dis-
closed in the financial statements but disclosure of which is neces-
sary to make the financial statements not misleading (emphasis 
added) 
(b) He fails to report any material misstatement known to him to 
appear in the financial statements 
(c) Etc., etc. 
It should be noted that paragraph (a) is aimed at the financial statements 
themselves; paragraph (b) leaves the concept open for the concept of influencing 
the investor. Paragraph (a) is "significant distortion;" paragraph (b) is 
"materiality." 
Proprietary Considerations 
I believe we must take note of the legal origin of the term materiality. I 
have pointed out before that frequent use of the term in accounting literature 
does not establish for accountants a proprietary right to the term. The courts 
would still try us subject to the legal concept of materiality if we had never 
mentioned the word in accounting literature. Nor do I believe the courts would 
be overly impressed with any standards we might adopt which looked only to 
accounting data. 
On the other hand the word significant is ours to do with what we will— 
despite some use of the term in SEC literature. We can have significance "in 
an accounting sense" and can set standards of significance if that seems desirable. 
However, as I have pointed out above, the adoption of such standards does not 
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absolve us from making a judgment also in each instance as to whether "in the 
light of all the circumstances" materiality might not suggest a lower factor. 
The question remains, if we adopt standards of significance, how do we 
police our standards? For instance, how would we deal with those cases where 
the courts rule that the "significant distortion factor" in a particular instance was 
not material? This is not an easy matter to decide. However, the present ethics 
rule with respect to mispresentation of material facts must be even more difficult 
to apply until some court has made a decision. How, for instance, would the 
Ethics Committee rule on the facts presented in Occidental Petroleum short of a 
decision in the courts? It would obviously ease the problem somewhat if their 
decision in a particular case was based only on the accounting data without the 
need to examine "all the circumstances." It would seem to me, moreover, that 
a judge would find a "standard of significant distortion" set by the accounting 
profession a useful starting point in arriving at his decision in a matter involving 
materiality. Here would be one factor quantified for him which he could weigh 
against other factors in arriving at his decision. 
Conclusions 
Adopting a standard of significant distortion does not do away with the 
problem of materiality, particularly where other factors indicate a lower level of 
concern. I have stated that I do not believe we can "standardize" the measure 
of such other factors. How, then, will the accountant deal with this problem? 
The first thing is for the accountant to recognize the problem exists. I will 
repeat a quote from an article written by Martin J . Whitman and Martin Shubik 
in The Financial Executive, May 1971, which takes issue with the importance at-
tached to net income by accountants as a factor in determining or influencing 
stock market values: 
The accountants, the regulatory authorities, and the so-called funda-
mentalists have taken a limited tool of analysis which is useful for ap-
praising large, stable public utilities which enjoy little, or no, tax shelter; 
which reinvest virtually all their retained earnings in their own in-
dustry; and whose common stockholders tend to be non-speculative and 
dividend-income conscious; and they have assumed that this is either 
the appropriate tool of analysis for almost all investor owned companies 
or that everyone else thinks that it is an appropriate tool of analysis. 
Many of us can remember the late 1950's when certain textile companies 
with reasonable earnings were selling below book value so that management 
found it advantageous to buy publicly traded stock into the Treasury to improve 
earnings per share. The relationship between earnings and market value was 
less than sensitive. The same can be said for many "start-up" ventures, the 
cable-T.V. companies being an excellent example in the first four or five years 
of their existence, when they are building their base load connections. At the 
other end of the scale are the established "high-flyers" where the market has 
discounted the future on the basis of an annualized coumpounded rate of growth. 
The stocks of such companies are significantly more sensitive to any failure to 
meet the expected earnings. I believe the accountant must make some evaluation 
of these investor behavioral patterns in assessing a materiality—as distinct from 
"significant distortion"—decision. 
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The example I cited earlier with respect to "times interest coverage" with 
respect to utility bonds suggests another area of sensitivity where contractual 
clauses of debt agreements impose restrictions of one kind or another on addi-
tional borrowing powers, freedom to pay dividends, etc. In marginal situations 
such restrictions may well influence a materiality decision. The accountant can 
surely be cognizant of these factors as they arise. I have attached as an Appendix 
a few additional examples to bring out the scope of the problem. 
The examples above, however, do not cover the whole field. Consider the 
effect of discovery of new oil or gas resources (Alaska), the impact of sudden 
new technology that makes existing plants obsolete (coke-oven gas when natural 
gas lines expanded), action of foreign governments (the copper companies), and 
so on. The items mentioned had such impact on investors that they superseded 
the reported earnings as a factor influencing investor behavior, sometimes over 
a period of years. 
My rule of "lower of the standard distortion factor or materiality factor" 
simplifies the problem by at least 50 per cent. The accountant need only concern 
himself with the situation where the materiality factor is lower—not higher— 
than the distortion factor. That is, the accounting data must be more important 
than usual and, as influencing the investor, these situations are usually within 
the ken of the accountant. 
And what of the other 50 per cent? I believe we have a way to go before 
we can come close to standardizing that. Much of stock market response is 
still pure Barnum & Bailey, a circus where W. C. Fields rates equal time with 
Graham & Dodd. I will close with the same paragraph I used to close my 
earlier article. 
By all means let us continue to discuss, dispute, dissect, deplore, and gen-
erally "look before and after and pine for what is not" in this matter of materiality. 
My personal opinion is that we must widen our understanding and narrow our 
judgments—short of official standards. 
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Appendix 
Some Interesting Examples Showing Problems in Determining 
Materiality Purely in Terms of Financial Statements 
Cases relatively insensitive to present earnings: 
From Newsweek—March 6, 1972: 
(a) Curtis Wright has doubled in price since January 1 and in one week 
alone nearly 30% of its shares were traded—all because the com-
pany hold limited North American rights to the Wankel engine, 
and on the fragile theory that the major automakers may turn to 
the Wankel and suddenly transform Curtis-Wright, one of the 
market's perennial laggards, into a hot property. 
(b) Cartridge Television, Inc. 
At current prices the stock market was saying the company was 
worth close to $75 million. Yet Cartridge T.V. not only hasn't 
made any profits, it isn't even scheduled to make its first sale until 
this month. But the company's story is that it hopes to cash in on 
a long-time dream—a massive consumer market for video recorders 
and video cassette players. 
Cases particularly sensitive to earnings: 
From Newsweek—July 26, 1971: 
When IBM reported that its second-quarter net was unchanged from a 
year ago at $2.22 a share—and added that the outlook for the rest of 
the year wasn't exciting—investors stampeded for the exit. The stock 
slumped 13 points in a single day, continued to drift lower and finally 
closed the week at $294-1/2 vs. the 1971 high of almost $366. 
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